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Abstract
This article offers a new perspective on battling credit card fraud. It departs from a focus on
post factum liability, which characterizes most legal scholarship and federal legislation on credit
card fraud and applies corrective mechanisms only after the damage is done. Instead, this article
focuses on preempting credit card fraud by tackling the root causes of the problem: the built-in
incentives that keep the credit card industry from fighting fraud on a system-wide basis. This
article examines how credit card companies and banks have created a self-interested infrastructure
that insulates them from the liabilities and costs of credit card fraud. Contrary to widespread
belief, retailers, not card companies or banks, absorb much of the loss caused by thieves who
shop with stolen credit cards. Also, credit card companies and banks earn fees from every credit
card transaction, including those that are fraudulent. In addressing these problems, this article
advocates broad reforms, including legislation that would mandate data security standards for
the industry, empower multiple stakeholders to create the new standards, and offer companies
incentives to comply by capping bank fees for those that are compliant, while deregulating fees
for those that are not compliant.
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keep the credit card industry from fighting fraud on a system-wide 
basis.  This article examines how credit card companies and banks 
have created a self-interested infrastructure that insulates them from 
the liabilities and costs of credit card fraud.  Contrary to widespread 
belief, retailers, not card companies or banks, absorb much of the 
loss caused by thieves who shop with stolen credit cards.  Also, 
credit card companies and banks earn fees from every credit card 
transaction, including those that are fraudulent.  In addressing these 
problems, this article advocates broad reforms, including legislation 
that would mandate data security standards for the industry, 
empower multiple stakeholders to create the new standards, and offer 
companies incentives to comply by capping bank fees for those that 
are compliant, while deregulating fees for those that are not 
compliant. 
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Credit card fraud, which is the use of another person’s credit card or 
credit card information for the purpose of stealing, offers criminals one 
of the fastest routes to riches today.  The windfalls, which can reach into 
the millions of dollars,2 have attracted a broad spectrum of criminals, 
ranging from foreign organized crime groups3 to local street gangs, such 
as the Los Angeles Crips.4
The problem has reached epidemic proportions.  Credit card fraud 
exceeded $3.2 billion in 2007,
 
5 which is thirty-five percent higher than 
in 2003.6  One expert estimates that as many as “[h]alf of all credit card 
numbers are in the hands of organized criminals” and that “[h]alf of all 
computers have some form of malware on them,”7
Credit card fraud can lead to identity theft,
 or malicious software 
that infiltrates a computer program, records keystrokes, detects account 
numbers and credit card data, and sends this data to the hacker without 
the victim’s knowledge. 
8
 
 2. See, e.g., Randall Stross, Digital Domain $9 Here, 20 Cents There and a 
Credit-Card Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2010, at BU3, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/22/business/22digi.html?_r=1&scp=5&sq=credit%20
card%20fraud&st=cse. 
 the cooption of another 
 3. See JOSEPH MENN, FATAL SYSTEM ERROR: THE HUNT FOR THE NEW CRIME 
LORDS WHO ARE BRINGING DOWN THE INTERNET 116 (2010) [hereinafter MENN, FATAL 
SYSTEM ERROR]. 
 4. See Joseph Menn, Gangs Get into Identity Theft, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2008, at 
C3, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/aug/12/business/fi-idtheft12. 
 5. Reed Richardson, Are You Compliant, SMALL BUSINESS ONLINE COMMUNITY 
(Apr. 17, 2008, 8:41 AM), http://smallbusinessonlinecommunity.bankofamerica.com/ 
blogs/merchantServices/2008/04/17/are-you-compliant/. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Interview by Spencer Michels with Joseph Menn, Reporter, FIN. TIMES (PBS 
broadcast, Aug. 12, 2010), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/science/july-
dec10/cyber_08-12.html (discussing “malware” and electronic theft of financial 
information). 
 8. Although credit card fraud and identity theft are related, the two should be 
distinguished.  Credit card fraud is the unauthorized use of a credit card or credit card 
information for the purpose of stealing.  Identity theft involves using stolen personal 
information, whether from a credit card account or other source, to impersonate 
another’s identity.  Identity thieves can use the stolen data to obtain new credit cards, 
loans, or lines of credit to purchase goods and services under the victim’s name.  See 
generally Erin Fonté, Who Should Pay the Price for Identity Theft?, 54 FED. LAW. 24, 
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individual’s personal information that is subsequently used to obtain 
new credit cards or bank accounts in the victim’s name, costing the 
victim time, money, and aggravation, as well as damaging his or her 
credit history.9  Credit card fraud can also take a major toll on 
businesses.  One study of 45 mid- to large-sized companies found that 
cybercrime cost each of them an average of $3.8 million per year.10  
These figures do not include the staggering secondary costs of fraud, 
which can include a loss in stock value,11 litigation,12 and payment for 
the reissuing of breached credit cards.13
A. THE CRUX OF THE PROBLEM  
 
There has been an outpouring of creative ideas on how to curb 
credit card fraud, including many ideas from legal scholars and federal 
lawmakers.  Few of these, however, focus on what we regard as the crux 
of the problem: the incentives built into the credit card industry14 to 
merely contain credit card fraud at “comfortable” levels rather than to 
attack it directly on a system-wide level.  The credit card companies15
 
26-27 (2007) (discussing various methods of identity theft).  Identity theft fraud consists 
of 4% of credit card fraud.  See Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Counterfeiting and 
Credit Card Fraud, http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/count-contre/cccf-ccp-eng.htm (last 
visited Aug. 15, 2010). 
 
 9. See Kevin M. Gatzlaff & Kathleen A. McCullough, The Effect of Data 
Breaches on Shareholder Wealth, 13 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 61, 63 (2010); Anne 
Borden, The Cost of Credit Card Fraud, LAWYERSANDSETTLEMENTS.COM (Apr. 29, 
2007), http://www.lawyersandsettlements.com/features/credit-card-fraud.html. 
 10. PONEMON INST., FIRST ANNUAL COST OF CYBER CRIME STUDY: BENCHMARK 
STUDY OF U.S. COMPANIES 2 (2010), available at http://www.arcsight.com/collateral/ 
whitepapers/Ponemon_Cost_of_Cyber_Crime_study_2010.pdf. 
 11. See Gatzlaff & McCullough, supra note 9, at 64, 67. 
 12. Id. at 61. 
 13. See Study Quantifies the Heavy Damage of Card Data Breaches, 
DIGITALTRANSACTIONS.NET (June 4, 2010), http://www.digitaltransactions.net/ 
newsstory.cfm?newsid=2548  (stating that in 2009 it cost companies $252.7 million to 
replace over 70 million in compromised cards). 
 14. The “credit card industry” in this article refers to the parties that play a role in 
credit card transactions.  These include the four major card companies, Visa, 
MasterCard, American Express, and Discover, see id., as well as the banks that issue 
and settle card transactions, the payment processors, and the merchants. 
 15. Although there are four major U.S. credit card companies, see 
DIGITALTRANSACTIONS.NET, supra note 13, for the sake of simplicity, the discussion in 
this article will often focus solely on Visa and MasterCard.  This is because Visa 
dominates the market by far, with MasterCard being the second largest company.  As of 
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and banks have engineered an infrastructure designed for their self-
benefit that insulates them from the true costs of credit card fraud, 
thereby blunting their incentives to vehemently fight fraud. 
Few people realize that retailers— not card companies or banks— 
absorb much of the loss16 caused by scammers who shop with stolen 
credit cards.17  The banks that issue credit cards may appear to pay for 
fraud because they cover cardholders’ unauthorized expenses.  In fact, 
however, they pass many of these losses back to the retailer who sold the 
goods to the criminal.  Further, the card brands18 and banks collect fees 
from every credit card transaction, regardless of whether it is fraudulent.  
The card brands also collect fines from the merchants who are victims of 
the scam.19  The upshot is that the card brands, which set the security 
standards for the industry, prefer to merely patch up their inherently 
fraud-prone security system rather than push for the adoption of safer 
payment technologies because that would require a greater investment.  
Meanwhile, millions of American businesses are vulnerable and credit 
card fraud continues to increase.20
This article argues that the legal scholarship and federal laws 
overlook this structural perspective.  The article, which is divided into 
five parts, advocates a new federal law that mandates data security 
standards and strengthens the industry’s incentives to comply.  Part I 
surveys the legal literature and pertinent federal legislation and shows 
how neither systematically addresses the crux of the problem.  Part II 
describes the mechanics of credit card transactions and how the industry 
officially tackles fraud.  Part III explains how the industry’s current 
 
 
the end of 2009 in the U.S., there were about 270 million Visa credit cards, about 203 
million MasterCard credit cards, 48.9 million American Express credit cards, and 54.4 
million Discover credit cards.  See Ben Woolsey & Matt Schulz, Credit Card Statistics, 
Industry Facts, Debt Statistics, http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-
card-industry-facts-personal-debt-statistics-1276.php.  In terms of global market share, 
Visa dominates, with MasterCard coming in second, and American Express a distant 
third. Visa had 64.79% of the 2009 global market share in terms of volume of purchase 
transactions.  MasterCard had 26.5%; and American Express had 4.57%.  See Nilson 
Report, Largest Payment Card Issuers Worldwide (2010), http://www.nilsonreport.com/ 
largestissuers/index.htm. 
 16. The assumption underlying the use of the term “loss” in this article is that the 
stolen goods will not be recovered, leaving someone else to pay for them. 
 17. See MENN, FATAL SYSTEM ERROR, supra note 3, at 115. 
 18. “Card brands” refer to the credit card companies. 
 19. See MENN, FATAL SYSTEM ERROR, supra note 3, at 115. 
 20. See infra Part III B. 
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approach to data security falls short.  Part IV explores the root causes for 
which the credit card industry is reluctant to aggressively tackle fraud.  
The article concludes with a wide-range of reform suggestions in Part V. 
 
I. REFORM PROPOSALS SKIRT THE KEY ISSUE  
ABOUT CREDIT CARD FRAUD 
A. THE LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP  
Although a plethora of law review articles have been written about 
credit card fraud and the related area of identity theft, virtually none 
consider the industry’s weak incentives to tackle fraud systematically.  
Instead, most legal scholars focus on how difficult it is under current law 
for victims of credit card fraud to win damages against companies 
whose computer networks were breached.  Federal laws, after all, rarely 
give victims a private right of action against breached companies.21  
Courts have been loath to find breached companies negligent so long as 
they did the minimum amount that is reasonable to secure data.22  Judges 
have been reluctant to give victims standing to force companies to be 
compliant with industry-wide security policies.23
Therefore, many legal scholars approach credit card fraud and 
related identity theft reform with the idea of strengthening the ability of 
victims to sue infiltrated companies.  For example, De Amond urges the 
adoption of common law or statutory torts to facilitate the ability of 
victims to sue breached companies for negligence.
 
24  Weaver 
recommends that states give consumers a private right of action to allow 
them to directly sue infiltrated companies so that they would not have to 
wait for the government to litigate on their behalf.25
 
 21. Federal courts have held, for example, that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
(discussed later) does not provide a private right of action.  See Dunmire v. Morgan 
Stanley DW, Inc., 475 F.3d 956, 960 (2007); In re French, 401 B.R. 295, 310 (2009). 
  White proposes the 
 22. See, e.g., Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Serv., 2006 WL 288483 at *4-5 (D. 
Minn. 2006) (holding a company that exercised reasonable care in handling personal 
information did not breach its duty to its customers despite a breach that was caused by 
one of its employees). 
 23. See e.g., In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 524 F. Supp. 2d 83 (D. Mass. 
2007). 
 24. Elizabeth D. De Amond, A Dearth of Remedies, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 52-53 
(2008). 
 25. Owen Weaver, Note, A Missed Opportunity to Bolster Consumer Protections in 
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recognition of a “negligence per se” cause of action for identity theft 
victims.26  Schneider advocates allowing victims to sue breached 
companies for “personal data exposure,” a newly recognized type of 
injury, even if no tangible harm is realized.27
Making it easier for victims to sue would undoubtedly help pressure 
companies to take security more seriously.  However, this approach 
overlooks that many parties in the credit card industry can shift their 
fraud losses to merchants and consumers, as discussed in Part IV.  As a 
result, making it easier for victims to litigate may not necessarily 
translate into better security, at least not to the degree expected. 
 
Other scholars approach credit card fraud and identity theft by 
urging the adoption of specific anti-fraud technologies.28  Technology 
plays a central role in data security but, as criminal tactics continually 
evolve, it is important that the incentives first change to encourage the 
industry to select the best technological solutions for itself on a 
continuing basis.  Right now, although a plethora of technological 
innovations exists, the banks and card companies appear more interested 
in not “rocking the boat” than in pushing for the best options for all 
parties.29
Yet other scholars call on Congress to pass legislation that would 
impose threshold requirements on handling confidential data
  The recommendations in Part V may help to change that. 
30
 
Massachusetts: How Massachusetts Residents Are Still Without a Private Right of 
Action After the TJX Security Breach, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 677, 700-03 (2009). 
 or that 
 26. Anthony E. White, Comment, The Recognition of a Negligence Cause of Action 
for Victims of Identity Theft: Someone Stole My Identity, Now Who Is Going To Pay For 
It?, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 847, 866 (2005) (arguing that the burden would then be placed 
on financial institutions, which are best able to avoid liability, to prove otherwise). 
 27. Jacob W. Schneider, Note, Preventing Data Breaches: Alternative Approaches 
to Deter Negligent Handling of Consumer Data, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 279, 291 
(2009) (citing KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 47-48 
(3d ed. 2007)) (arguing that, although the idea of potential damages is rare, it is not 
completely foreign to tort law).  Schneider suggests that if a retailer is found to have 
caused injury, damages awarded to the state should be used to compensate victims of 
identity theft stemming from that incident.  Id. at 292. 
 28. See, e.g., Ian Heller, Note, How the Internet Has Expanded the Threat of 
Financial Identity Theft, And What Congress Can Do To Fix the Problem, 17 KAN. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 84, 106-08 (2007) (advocating biometrics as one of two proposed 
alternatives to combat identity theft). 
 29. See infra Part III. 
 30. Amanda Draper, Comment, Identity Theft: Plugging the Massive Data Leaks 
with a Stricter Nationwide Breach-Notification Law, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 681, 699 
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would require corporations to draft privacy policies.31
B. FEDERAL LEGISLATION PERTINENT TO CREDIT CARD FRAUD  
DOES NOT TACKLE THE REAL PROBLEM  
  These are critical 
first steps.  However, threshold requirements need to be specific.  
Privacy policies need to be compatible with other firms’ policies, as 
security in the financial marketplace is interdependent: if the receiving 
firm is secure but the sending firm is not, security is meaningless.  As 
importantly, any new law needs to offer companies tangible benefits to 
become compliant with security requirements, as detailed in Part V. 
Federal laws also fail to give the credit card industry strong enough 
incentives to combat credit card fraud on a system-wide basis.  Only a 
few federal laws even require companies to preempt cyber crime.  Most 
pertinent laws tackle credit card fraud and related identity theft by 
criminalizing these acts, thereby providing for the punishment of the 
thieves after the fact, rather than requiring the prevention of data 
breaches beforehand.  For example, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
of 1986 (“CFAA”) establishes civil and criminal penalties for 
unauthorized access to computerized data belonging to financial 
institutions or the federal government.32  The Cyber-Security 
Enhancement Act of 200233 (“CSEA”) makes it a crime to hack into a 
computer and enhances the criminal penalties already available under 
the CFAA.34
 
(2007).  “The new law,” Draper writes, should “impose strict requirements on how 
companies handle their confidential data, such as making it illegal to send out 
information in the mail or online that contains a person’s Social Security number, not 
allowing companies to share their personal customer data with their affiliates, or placing 
tighter controls on the granting of credit.”  Id. 
  The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 
1998 (“ITADA”) criminalizes identity theft and provides for the FTC to 
 31. See, e.g., Robert Sprague & Corey Ciochetti, Preserving Identities: Protecting 
Personal Identifying Information Through Enhanced Privacy Policies and Laws, 19 
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 91, 130 (2009) (proposing a model statute that would require all 
companies to draft privacy policies designed to protect personal information); Kenneth 
M. Siegel, Comment, Protecting the Most Valuable Corporate Asset: Electronic Data, 
Identity Theft, Personal Information, and the Role of Data Security in the Information 
Age, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 779, 810 (2007) (suggesting that companies develop a 
company-wide strategy to secure electronic information and that consumers, in turn, 
need to take proactive measures to protect themselves from theft). 
 32. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2005). 
 33. Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 225, 116 Stat. 2135, 2156. 
 34. Id. § 225(g). 
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establish procedures to receive complaints about it.35
One goal of acts that criminalize and penalize credit card fraud and 
identity theft, as in the CFAA, CSEA, and ITDA, is to deter would-be 
criminals.  However, political and practical limitations curb the 
effectiveness of these laws.  First, cybercrime is increasingly perpetrated 
by foreign organized criminals whose governments refuse to extradite 
these perpetrators.
 
36  Therefore, these criminals have little reason to fear 
these laws.  Second, in the United States, law enforcement has not been 
able to keep up with credit card fraud,37
Congress also has passed a number of laws to protect consumers 
from unauthorized credit card charges and losses tied to identity theft.  
Thus, the Truth in Lending Act
 thus reducing domestic thieves’ 
reasons to fear prosecution under these laws. 
38 (“TILA”), Regulation Z,39 and the Fair 
Credit Billing Act40 (“FCBA”) limit consumer liability for unauthorized 
charges to $50 in most cases.41  The Identity Theft Enforcement and 
Restitution Act of 2008 (“ITERA”) enables victims of identity theft to 
seek restitution for money spent restoring their credit and fixing other 
associated harms.42
In fact, while these laws protect victims from some of the “front-
end,” or direct, costs of fraud, consumers eventually pick up most of the 
  However, none of these laws helps to improve 
security before the fact. 
 
 35. 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2005). 
 36. See MENN, FATAL SYSTEM ERROR, supra note 3. 
 37. See Avivah Litan, Small Business Account Takeovers Have Regulators, Law 
Enforcers on the Defense, GARNTER BLOG (May 12, 2010), 
http://blogs.gartner.com/avivah-litan/2010/05/12/small-business-account-takeovers-
have-regulators-law-enforcers on-the-defense/. 
 38. The Truth in Lending Act is contained in Title I of the Consumer Credit 
Protection Act, as amended. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006).  This was enacted in 1968 to 
protect consumers by requiring the disclosure of key terms and costs in lending 
transactions.  See generally Matthew Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of 
Mandatory Disclosure: Socio-Economics and the Quest for Truth in Lending, 14 
Cornell J. L. & Pub. Policy 199 (2005). 
 39. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1.  Regulation Z was promulgated by The Federal Reserve 
Board to implement TILA pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1607.  It caps consumer liability for 
credit card fraud to $50 in most cases.  See generally Duncan B. Douglas, An 
Examination of the Fraud Liability Shift in Consumer Card-based Payment Systems, 33 
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 43-49 (2009). 
 40. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006). 
 41. See, e.g., id. § 1643 (a)(1)(B) (1980). 
 42. See Pub. L. No. 110-326, 122 Stat. 3560. 
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tab at the “back-end” in the form of higher prices and other indirect 
charges.  TILA, Regulation Z, FCBA, and ITERA thus may leave 
consumers with the false impression that someone else will clean up the 
messes made by cyber thieves, thereby potentially dampening the public 
will to battle the thieves. 
The two laws that come closest to requiring corporations to tackle 
credit card fraud preemptively are the Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act43 (“FACTA”) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act44 
(“GLBA”).  FACTA requires merchants to truncate credit card numbers 
to no more than five digits and refrain from including the expiration 
dates on receipts.45
The GLBA requires financial institutions “to insure the security and 
confidentiality of customer records and information”
  While FACTA is important, it deals only with a tiny 
part of merchants’ vulnerability to hacking.  Much more is needed. 
46 and directs the 
FTC, along with other government entities, to issue regulations ensuring 
their protection.47  The GLBA instructs financial institutions to develop 
privacy policies and safeguards to protect data, including writing a data 
security plan detailing the security procedures.48  The plan must 
designate at least one employee to manage it; build a comprehensive risk 
management profile for every department in the institution that handles 
private information; develop, monitor, and test the data security 
program; and change the data protection plan as needed to comply with 
how the data is stored.49
While the GLBA seeks to tackle credit card fraud preemptively, it 
offers few specifics.  In fact, the GLBA’s entire security guidelines are 





 43. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2003). 
 in place.  It does not ask that their data be, in fact, 
secure in any practical sense.  The law does not require encryption, 
passwords, or firewalls – all fairly rudimentary security precautions.  
 44. Id. § 6801 (2000). 
 45. Id. § 1681c (g)(1) (2005). 
 46. Id. § 6801(b)(1) (2000). 
 47. Id. § 6801(b)(1)-(3) (2000). 
 48. 66 Fed. Reg. 8616, 8619-20 (2000). See also Fonté, supra note 8. 
 49. Id. at 8620-25 (2000).  For the mandates, see 16 F.R. at 8620 – 8625.  See also 
Fonté, supra note 8. 
 50. See 16 C.F.R. § 314.4(b) (2002).  This subsection is part of what are known as 
the “Safeguard Rules” – regulations published by the FTC in 2002 to safeguard 
customer information.  See Companies Comply to Safeguard Rules (2010), 
http://www.identitytheft.com/article/companies_safeguard_rules. 
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Moreover, it seems that firms may not necessarily need to take these 
precautions to satisfy the law’s requirement of “reasonable measures.” 
Consider the case of Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Serv.,51 where 
the court did not find Brazos, a student loan provider, to have violated 
the GLBA for allowing an employee to take a laptop home, which the 
employee subsequently stole along with the unencrypted financial data 
of 550,000 customers.  The court held that, because the loan provider 
had adequate written security policies, risk assessment reports, and other 
safeguards, it complied with the GLBA.52  It did not matter that the firm 
allowed its employee to regularly download sensitive data on his laptop 
to work on at home without encrypting the data.  Though this might 
strike many as a glaring red flag, the court held it was not reasonably 
required by the GLBA.53
 
 
II. THE MECHANICS OF THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY 
To understand the structural incentives of the credit card industry, it 
is important to grasp the mechanics of credit card transactions, their 
points of vulnerability to fraud, and the way the industry tries to combat 
these problems.  This Part provides that foundation. 
A. CREDIT CARD AUTHORIZATION AND SETTLEMENT  
Two main series of transactions involve credit cards: authorization 
and settlement.54  During the process of authorization, a merchant 
obtains “permission from the bank that issued the card to accept the card 
for payment.”55  Settlement is a multi-step process in which the 
merchant’s own bank pays the authorized charge to the merchant  and  
the merchant recovers the charged amount from the authorizing, or 
issuing, bank.56
 
 51. 2006 WL 288483 (D. Minn. 2006). 
  Although authorization and settlement practices vary 
 52. Id. at * 4. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Ramon P. DeGennaro, Merchant Acquirers and Payment Card Processors: A 
Look Inside the Black Box, 91 FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV. 27, 32 (2006), 
available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/erq106_degennaro.pdf. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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somewhat by card brand,57 we describe herein those used for the two 





The authorization process starts when a cardholder swipes his or 
her credit card through a card reader at a merchant, say, Target.  Let us 
assume that the card is a Visa card issued by Bank of America.  Target’s 
card reader processes the information from the magnetic stripe, 
including the card number, expiration date, and verification code.59  The 
card reader then electronically transmits the card information, together 
with the dollar value of the transaction, to a “payment processor,” or a 
company hired by retailers to handle their card transactions.60
Visa identifies the “card issuing bank,” or “issuer,” here, Bank of 
America, and electronically forwards the information to it for 
authorization.  Bank of America verifies the card information against 
data it keeps on file and checks whether the cardholder has enough 
credit to cover the purchase.  The card issuer accordingly approves or 
denies the transaction, and routes its decision back to Target through 
Visa and the payment processor.
  The 
processor electronically forwards the information to the appropriate 
Card Association member, as the industry often calls credit card 






The settlement process begins when Target electronically submits 
the day’s credit card payments to its payment processor, who forwards 
them to Target’s “acquiring bank,” sometimes referred to as the 
 
 57. DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC: THE 
DIGITAL EVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING 9-12 (2d ed. 2005). 
 58. American Express and Discover work slightly differently.  Id. at 12.  We focus 
here on Visa and MasterCard for the sake of simplicity. 
 59. For a discussion of the security code, see infra note 80. 
 60. Mark Hassinen et al., Emerging Trends in Information: An Open, PKI-Based 
Mobile Payment System, 3995 LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCI. 86, 92 (2006).  There 
are about 10 U.S. payment processors.  See First Data Thought Leadership & Rob 
McMillon, Where Security Fits in the Payment Processing Chain (2010), 
http://www.firstdata.com/downloads/thought-leadership/where_security_fits.pdf. 
 61. EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 57, at 10. 
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“acquirer” or “merchant bank.”  The acquiring bank gives Target a line 
of credit and agrees to immediately deposit the money due to it from its 
daily credit card transactions to its bank account (minus various fees).  
The acquiring bank essentially loans the money to Target until the 
issuing bank pays the charge.  The acquirer sorts and submits Target’s 
credit card transactions to the appropriate Card Association members.  
So for a transaction with a Bank of America-issued Visa card, the 
acquirer submits that transaction to Bank of America, which records the 
transaction in the cardholder’s account and pays the acquiring bank 
(minus fees).  The issuing bank later receives payment from the 
cardholder, usually on a monthly basis.  Although these processes seem 
complex, ever since credit card processing became electronic in 2005, 
they take mere seconds.62
B. CREDIT CARD FRAUD – DISTINCTIONS AND MECHANICS  
 
It is also important to grasp the mechanics of credit card fraud and 
to distinguish between different types of fraud.  One key distinction 
considers how hackers steal data.  The two most common ways are: (1) 
manually, where the thieves retrieve data during the time that they are 
infiltrating a computer, and (2) through a concealed automated program, 
such as a virus or malware installed in the victim’s computer system.  
These programs can “sniff” sensitive data and transmit it back to the 
hacker until they are discovered, which can take months.63
Once hackers have the information, they can easily copy it into a 
  The latter is 
more dangerous than the former because malware lies in wait to copy 
data as it becomes available, such as when it is being transmitted.  Thus, 
malware can capture data even if the company does not store it.  On the 
other hand, old-fashioned manual hacking is less likely to be able to do 
so because it is unlikely to infiltrate a system at the precise moment 
when the data is being transmitted. 
 
 62. Joseph Trigliari, How Credit Card Processing Works, available at 
http://www.pivotalpayments.com/ca/industry-news/how-credit-card-processing-works-
800343615/. 
 63. WADE BAKER ET AL., VERIZON RISK TEAM, 2010 DATA BREACH 
INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 22 (2010), available at http://www.verizonbusiness.com/ 
resources/reports/rp_2010-data-breach-report_en_xg.pdf.  Thieves used a sniffer to steal 
data from over 45 million credit cards as the data was being transmitted from wireless 
POS systems to TJ Maxx’s server.  See Benjamin Ngugi et al., PCI Compliance: 
Overcoming the Challenges, 3 INT’L J. INFO. SEC. & PRIVACY 54 (2009). 
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new magnetic stripe to create a counterfeit credit card64 for use in stores, 
in what are known as “card-present” transactions.  Alternatively, they 
may use the data to shop over the internet, phone, or mail,65 in what are 
known as “card-not-present” transactions.  In the latter, the thief needs 
to convince the store to ship to an address different from the victim’s 
address  to avoid alerting the victim, which many thieves have figured 
out how to do.  If the thief steals enough data, he or she may also 
impersonate the victim’s identity and open new accounts in their name.66
This raises another important distinction between types of credit 
card fraud: stealing credit card data from a business’s computer network 
versus using a stolen credit card to shop.  The former may never result in 
a loss if the breach is reported and the cards are blocked in time.  The 
latter, however, will result in a loss if the transaction is authorized. 
 
C. THE RULES OF THE GAME: PCI STANDARDS  
The credit card industry attempts to protect itself through security 
standards called the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard 
(“PCI DSS”), informally referred to as “PCI standards,” “PCI rules,” or 
simply “PCI.”  The rules came about when, after years of retailer 
confusion over different company-specific data security standards, the 
world’s five largest credit card companies — Visa, MasterCard, 
American Express, Discover, and Tokyo-based JCB Co.67 — formed the 
“PCI Security Council.”68  In June 2006, they issued the standards.69
 
 64. Thirty seven percent of all funds stolen through credit cards are stolen with the 
use of counterfeit cards.  See Royal Canadian Mounted Police, supra note 8. 
 
 65. This kind of fraud is sometimes known as “existing” account fraud.  Such fraud 
consists of about 10% of credit card fraud.  See Royal Canadian Mounted Police, supra 
note 8. 
 66. C. M. Kahn & W. Roberds, Credit and Identity Theft, 55 J. MONETARY ECON. 
251, 264 (2008). 
 67. Fonté, supra note 8, at 28. 
 68. See Ngugi et al., supra note 63, at 55.  See also Richardson, supra note 5. 
 69. See Press Release, PCI Security Standards Council, Five Leading Payment 
Brands Unite to Strengthen Global Data Security (Sept. 7, 2006), available at 
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pdfs/09-07-06.pdf.  For standards, see PCI 
Security Standards Council, The Prioritized Approach to Pursue PCI DSS Compliance, 
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/Prioritized_Approach_PCI_DSS_1_2.
pdf  (last visited Aug. 15, 2010).  PCI-DSS was started by Visa and MasterCard.  
Subsequently, the other credit card-issuing companies joined the effort.  See John Winn 
& Kevin Govern, Identity Theft: Risks and Challenges to Business of Data 
Compromise, 28 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 49, 53-54 (2009). 
2011] CREDIT CARD FRAUD: A NEW PERSPECTIVE 759 
ON TACKLING AN INTRANSIGENT PROBLEM   
 
The standards apply to all companies that accept, store, or transmit 
credit card data.  They require basic measures, such as that firms erect 
firewalls, encrypt data, keep cardholder data storage to a minimum, and 
remove security codes from storage after a payment has been 
authorized.70
There is a validation process to make sure that companies are in 
compliance with the PCI standards.  The process is tiered, so that the 
larger the company as measured by volume of yearly transactions, the 
more rigorous the validation process.  Visa categorizes companies into 
four tiers, or “Levels.”  As seen in Table 1, the vast majority of 
companies (over 6 million) are Level 4 firms, which are small 
businesses that process fewer than 20,000 online transactions or up to 
one million store transactions a year. 
 
 








Number of Visa Transactions Per Year 
1 326 over 6 million 
2 709 1 million to 6 million 




less than 20,000 e-commerce transactions and all firms 
processing up to 1 million transactions a year 
 
The requirement that companies comply with PCI is also embedded 
in the contracts between the parties involved in authorization and 
settlement.  Instead of negotiating a separate agreement with each issuer, 
each acquirer simply joins the relevant “card network,” an association of 
banks that issue credit cards,72
 
 70. Other rules that companies must follow include using and regularly updating 
antivirus software, developing and maintaining the security of the business’s systems, 
and monitoring and analyzing access to secure systems to prevent unnecessary access to 
information.  See PCI Security, The Prioritized Approach, supra note 69. 
 and “agrees to comply with its rules for 
 71. Ngugi et al., supra note 63. 
 72. RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD:  THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF 
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all transactions on that network.”73  The standard network contract 
between the payment processor and merchant requires the merchant to 
comply with PCI.74  Since merchants do not contract directly with the 
banks or card brands, but only with the payment processor,75
 
 the issuing 
and acquiring banks embed their requirements of the merchants in the 
processor/merchant contract, including PCI compliance. 
III. PCI SECURITY RULES ARE BROKEN 
A. INEFFECTIVE PCI RULES DESIGNED TO  
PATCH UP A FLAWED TECHNOLOGY  
The PCI security system is broken.  The problem is that credit card 
companies are wedded to a fraud-prone technology: credit cards with 
magnetic stripes.  This technology, which is about forty years old,76 
makes counterfeiting trivially easy.77  Data on the magnetic stripe is not 
encrypted.  It can be read by the most rudimentary card-reading 
machines.78
In the physical world, credit cards were supposed to be 
authenticated by cardholders’ signatures.
  Thieves can clone it onto another piece of plastic in a 
matter of seconds, and use it for hundreds of transactions. 
79
 
PAYMENT CARD MARKETS AROUND THE WORLD 20 (2006). 
  However, the reality is that 
signatures are easy to forge.  Few cashiers have the training to identify 
 73. Id. at 21. 
 74. See, e.g., National Processing Company, Merchant Processing Agreement: 
Terms and Conditions, at 7, available at http://images.paysimple.com/files/npc.pdf 
[hereinafter NPC]. 
 75. The card brands contract with the acquiring banks, who contract with the 
payment processors, who contract with merchants, and who in turn contract with the 
service providers.  See David Navetta, Who is Minding the Legal Risk Around PCI?, 
ISSA JOURNAL, 19 (2009). 
 76. See LEWIS MANDELL, THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY: A HISTORY 143 (1990). 
 77. Dave Whitelegg, Love it or Hate it, PCI DSS helps cut UK Card Fraud, 
available at http://blog.itsecurityexpert.co.uk/2010/10/love-it-or-hate-it-pci-dss-helps-
cut-uk.html. 
 78. See Jay S. Albanese, Fraud: The Characteristic Crime of the Twenty-first 
Century, in COMBATING PIRACY:  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT AND FRAUD 6 (Jay S. 
Albanese ed., 2006). 
 79. See GPayments, An Introduction to Authentication (2001), available at 
http://www.gpayments.com/pdfs/GPayments_Introduction_to_Authentication_Whitepa
per.pdf. 
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bogus signatures.  In addition, signatures are not even possible for online 
purchases, which were probably never foreseen when the magnetic 
stripe cards were devised.  Yet, instead of investing in safer technologies 
that depart from the magnetic stripe, the credit card companies built the 
PCI security system around trying to secure magnetic stripe data. 
Consider PCI’s key rule prohibiting companies from electronically 
storing credit card security codes on the back of the cards.80  The rule 
assumes that, should hackers steal the magnetic stripe data, they would 
not be able to use the card because they would not have the security 
code.  In fact, however, the three-digit security code is easy to figure 
out.81
Moreover, even if merchants try not to store security codes, they 
may do so inadvertently.  Most computers and point of sale systems 
have numerous programs creating logs in different places that store 
credit card track data.
 
82  Many merchants lack the sophistication to turn 
off preferences for logging and storage.  Even if those preferences are 
turned off, certain computer operations are capable of triggering a 
function that automatically reactivates logging for backup recovery and 
security purposes.83
 
 80. See DeGennaro, supra note 54, at 40.  As DeGennaro explains, credit card 
companies “have long encoded a verification number into the magnetic stripe on the 
back of the card.  Visa calls this code the Card Verification Value (CVV or CVV1); 
MasterCard’s term is the Card Validation Code (CVC or CVC1).  This code, read 
during the swipe, confirms that the card is actually present at the point of sale.  The 
problem is that this approach cannot help for Internet or MOTO transactions because 
the card is not present and a swipe is impossible.”  Id.  PCI  Requirement 3 requires 
merchants to protect cardholder data.  See PCI Security Standards Council, The 
Prioritized Approach, supra note 69; NPC, supra note 74, at 7. 
  Consequently, what are thought to be impregnable 
 81. Three digits can be combined in just 1,000 ways.  The difficulty of guessing a 
password key depends on the number of possible combinations that can be formed with 
the given password key length. This increases exponentially with increasing password 
key size: (xn) where x is the number base (for example 2 for binary and 10 for decimal 
numbers) and n is the password length. Thus, for a three-decimal digit credit card code 
security, the number of combinations is 103 , which equals 1000. This would take 
relatively little time to work out with a computer program - hence our assertion that “a 
three digit code is easy to figure out.  See M. Whitman & H. Mattord, Principles of 
Information Security (2d ed.)(2005). 
 82. VeriSign, Lessons Learned: Top Reasons for PCI Audit Failure and How to 
Avoid Them, at 4 (2006), available at http://www.verisign.com/static/ 
PCI_REASONS.pdf. 
 83. See Automated Event Log Management for PCI DSS Compliance, at 1 (2009), 
available at http://www.gfi.com/whitepapers/automated-event-log-management-for-
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security codes may be easily compromised.  The results from one audit 
revealed that seventy-nine percent of companies do not adequately 
safeguard sensitive cardholder data, including the security codes.84
Another inadequate way in which PCI tries to shore up credit cards 
is by merely requiring the encryption of cardholder data in “transmission 
across open, public networks.”
 
85
B. MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT OF PCI COMPLIANCE  
  In so doing, data stored on private 
networks becomes susceptible to misappropriation by hackers and 
malicious programs. 
1. Large Firms: PCI Compliant – But How Safe Are They? 
 
By conducting independent assessments of firms, the card brands 
have also attempted to enforce a compliance regime for PCI standards.  
Level 1 firms undergo the most stringent review process,86 whereas 
Level 2 and 3 firms enjoy more latitude.87  Curiously, Level 4 firms 
escape scrutiny, thus raising serious security concerns.88  From an 
enforcement perspective, the card brands may also fine89 noncompliant 
and breached businesses and de-list90
 
pci-dss.pdf. 
 or strip them of the ability to 
accept credit cards.  Just as importantly, an acquirer may refuse to 
process card payments, resulting in a business’s reputational damage for 
 84. VeriSign, supra note 82, at 4. 
 85. The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard outlines twelve 
requirements designed to improve payment account security, including the encryption 
of cardholder data across otherwise vulnerable public networks.  See PCI Security 
Standards Council, The Prioritized Approach, supra note 69. 
 86. See Visa, Inc., Data Security Bulletin:  Visa PCI DSS Compliance Validation 
Framework 2-3 (Nov. 18, 2008), available at http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/ 
cisp-bulletin-visa-pci-dss-framework-111808.pdf. 
 87. See Ponemon Institute Report, PCI DSS Compliance Survey (Sept. 24, 2009), 
available at http://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/fckjail/generalcontent/18/file/ 
PCI%20DSS%20Survey%20Key%20Findings%20FINAL4.pdf. 
 88. See Joan Herbig, Level 4: The small merchant PCI challenge (Apr. 27, 2009), 
available at http://www.greensheet.com/gs_online.php?story_id=1319. 
 89. See infra Part IV. 
 90. See ControlScan et al., What Small Merchants Know (and Don’t Know) about 
PCI Compliance: A Research Report (2009), available at http://www.nrf.com/ 
modules.php?name=Documents&op=showlivedoc&sp_id=3511; see also DeGennaro, 
supra note 54. 
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failure to service clients.91  PCI’s enforcement program has proven 
resoundingly effective, as evidenced by the high compliance rates for 
Level 1 and 2 firms (96% and 95%, respectively).92
Despite the resources available to the card brands, it remains 
unclear to what degree PCI compliance ensures reliable security.  For 
purposes of illustration, twenty-one percent of businesses validated as 
PCI compliant during their most recent PCI assessments fell prey to 
credit card fraud.
 
93  With one exception, the businesses from this sample 
were grouped in the Level 1 category94 (and, by definition, were the 
subjects of comprehensive PCI assessments).  For example, Heartland, a 
large payment processor, was PCI compliant, but was the target of a 
successful hacking attack.95  More disturbing, Hannaford Brothers, a 
large, reputable supermarket chain, was in the process of  being 
recertified as PCI compliant even as malware infected servers at each of 
its approximately 300 stores, transmitting millions of credit card 
numbers to thieves over a period of months.96
 
 
2. Small Firms: The Weakest Link 
 
PCI enforcement of Level 4 firms lacks definable parameters.  
From a logistical standpoint, the PCI Council cannot monitor all Level 4 
firms – that is, a total of approximately six million businesses.  The 
Council, therefore, requires that Level 4 firms complete individual self-
assessment forms,97
As a general proposition, though, the vast majority of Level 4 
 the contents of which are seldom meaningfully 
challenged. 
 
 91. See Ellen Libenson, Dollars and Sense: Calculating PCI Noncompliance Costs, 
E-COMMERCE TIMES, Dec. 12, 2007, available at http://www.technewsworld.com/ 
story/60712.html. 
 92. Visa, Inc., U.S. PCI DSS Compliance Status (June 30, 2010), 
http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/cisp_pcidss_compliancestats.pdf. 
 93. See BAKER ET AL., supra note 63, at 53. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Warwick Ashford, Heartland Data Breach Proves PCI Compliance Is Not 
Enough, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM, Jan. 26, 2009, http://www.computerweekly.com/ 
Articles/2009/01/28/234421/Heartland-data-breach-proves-PCI-compliance-is-not-
enough.htm. 
 96. Andrew Conry-Murray, Hundreds of Servers Compromised in Hannaford 
Breach, INFORMATIONWEEK’S SEC. WEBLOG (Mar. 28, 2008, 3:44 PM), 
http://www.informationweek.com/blog/main/archives/2008/03/hundreds_of_ser.html. 
 97. Visa, Data Security Bulletin, supra note 86. 
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companies are noncompliant.98  Indeed, an alarming number of Level 4 
merchants do not adhere to the most elementary of PCI rules, such as the 
rule on encryption.99  Despite this, Level 4 business’ compliance levels 
continue to decrease.100  The failure to remedy this situation is important 
because Level 4 merchants collectively account for 99 percent of all 
credit card transactions in the United States.101  These firms unleash the 
highest number of data breaches102 and “are increasingly a larger 
percentage of compromise incidents.”103  One survey found them 
responsible for 85 percent of all credit card breaches.104
The problem is that credit card companies give small merchants no 
incentive to be compliant.  Since they rely solely on trust and do not 
verify the merchants’ self assessment forms, credit card companies are 
unlikely to fine or delist these merchants for noncompliance until after a 
breach is discovered.  At the same time, the credit card companies and 
banks fail to reward Level 4 firms for compliance or subsidize their 
expenses, even though research shows that most of these firms cannot 
afford to comply with PCI.
 
105  Cost stands as “the main obstacle,” as one 
study concluded.106
 
 98. See, e.g., Mike Masin, The Cost of PCI Non-Compliance for Small Businesses 
(Part 3 of 3), THE VIEW FROM UNDER THE HAT (Jan. 25, 2010), 
http://m2.atstuff.com/the-cost-of-pci-non-compliance-for-small-businesses-part-3-of-3/.  
See also PCI Compliance Fines For Small Business Breaches, BRAINTREE (Oct. 18, 
2007), http://www.braintreepaymentsolutions.com/blog/pci-related-fines-for-breaches-
at-small-businesses (finding that, since 2005, over 80 % of card breaches have occurred 
at small merchants). 
  Compliance can cost around $81,000 for a small 
 99. Jaikumar Vijayan, Update: New Retail Data Breach May Have Affected 
Millions of Hannaford Shoppers, COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 17, 2008, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9068999/Update_New_retail_data_breach_ma
y_have_affected_millions_of_Hannaford_shoppers. 
 100. PONEMON INST, supra note 10. 
 101. Masin, The Cost of PCI Non-Compliance, supra note 98. 
 102. See, e.g., id. See also BRAINTREE, supra note 98. 
 103. Mike Masin, Fraud Prevention for Small Business Owners,  TH E V IE W 
FR OM  U ND ER  T HE HA T  (Feb .  12 ,  2010),  http://m2.atstuff.com/fraud-
prevention-for-small-business-owners/. 
 104. Kelly Jackson Higgins, National Retail Federation Poll: Small Retailers 
Struggling To Understand PCI, DARKREADING.COM (Aug. 11, 2009, 3:46 PM), 
http://www.darkreading.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=219200246. 
 105. Penelope N. Lazarou, Note and Comment, Small Businesses and Identity Theft: 
Reallocating the Risk of Loss, 10 N.C. BANKING INST. 305, 315 (2006); See also Masin, 
The Cost of PCI Non-Compliance, supra note 98. 
 106. PONEMAN INST., supra note 10, at 1. 
2011] CREDIT CARD FRAUD: A NEW PERSPECTIVE 765 
ON TACKLING AN INTRANSIGENT PROBLEM   
 
business, though that number will vary depending on its precise size and 
complexity, in addition to outlays to keep pace with security 
developments.107  For “‘mom and pop’ dry cleaners, pizza parlors, and 
convenience stores,” that is too expensive.108  Thus, many small 




3. Incoherence in Action:  
Forcing Merchants to Jeopardize Their Security 
 
Ironically, the acquiring banks, which require merchants to be PCI 
compliant,110 also essentially require them to jeopardize their security.  
The banks embed in the merchant-processor contract a provision that the 
merchants must store credit card data in their computers for one to two 
years.111
Storing sensitive data, however, turns merchants into magnets for 
hackers – especially since PCI rules to protect stored data are so 
inadequate.  Merchants are told that they must provide the acquiring 
bank with this stored data in the event of a “retrieval request” by the 
Card Issuer, which occurs when a cardholder disputes a charge and 
wants it reversed, when there is a point of sale error, or when there is a 
fraud inquiry.
 
112  The banks and card brands, however, already keep 
electronic copies of these same records.113
Ironically, however, it is not necessary to require merchants to store 
  Therefore, it is hard to 
understand why they force businesses to store this sensitive data – other 
than that it is convenient for them.  It is easier to have the merchant 
search for and produce a document rather than to do it themselves. 
 
 107. See Pui-Wing Tam & Robin Sidel, Security-Software Industry’s Miniboom, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2007, at B3, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB119128527341745878.html. 
 108. ControlScan et al., What Small Merchants Know, supra note 90, at 9. 
 109. Bob Sullivan, Instant Credit Means Instant Identity Theft, MSNBC.COM (May 
25, 2005), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6762127/. 
 110. See discussion supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 111. See NPC, supra note 74, at 16. 
 112. See id. at 11.  See also Chase Bank, Handling Retrieval Requests, CHASE.COM, 
https://www.chase.com/cm/crb/sbfs/page/request.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2010). 
 113. The credit card companies and issuing banks keep copies of the data they 
transmit during the authorization and settlement processes.  See DeGennaro, supra note 
54. 
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credit card data for the sake of satisfying retrieval requests related to 
disputes, errors, or investigations.  While it may have been necessary 
historically, when manual credit card punch machines were used114 and a 
merchant’s only record of a transaction was the paper duplicate,115
 
 
today, the information is electronic, and can be used in that form to 
settle the said retrieval requests. 
4. Tokenization Could Solve the Problem of Unsafe Data Storage  
            for Retrieval Requests: But is it Used? 
 
Moreover, merchants could satisfy the same retrieval requests 
without storing any credit card data.  With tokenization, the substitution 
of the credit card number with a string of other numbers called a 
token,116 merchants store the token, not the credit card number or other 
data on the card’s magnetic stripe.  Rather, the payment processor or 
bank keeps the credit card number and associated data in a secure server 
or “vault,” and is able to map tokens to their corresponding credit card 
numbers.  The logic of tokenization is based on the premise that it is 
easier to secure one central vault than multiple company networks.117  In 
the event of a retrieval request, the party that controls the vault would 
get the cardholder credit card number and transaction details from the 
cardholder or issuer, pass the matching token to the merchant and ask 
for the electronic receipt.  Production of the matching receipt by the 
merchant would show the authenticity of the transaction.118
In July 2010, Visa publicly agreed, in a nod to the National Retail 
 
 
 114. Sankarson Banerjee, Credit Card Security on the Net: Where is it Today?, 12 J. 
FIN. TRANSFORMATION 21, 21-23 (2004). 
 115. Douglas Akers et al., Overview of Recent Developments, 17 FDIC BANKING 
REV. 3, 23 (2005). 
 116. Avivah Litan & John Pescatore, Using Tokenization to Reduce PCI 
Compliance Requirements, GARTNER.COM (2009), http://www.gartner.com/ 
DisplayDocument?doc_cd=169939&ref=g_fromdoc; Gary Palgon, Best Practices In 
Data Protection, RETAIL SOLUTIONS ONLINE (Apr. 21, 2010), 
http://www.retailsolutionsonline.com/article.mvc/Best-Practices-In-Data-Protection-
0002. 
 117. See First Data & McMillon, supra note 60, at 3, 12-13. 
 118. See HEATHER MARK, SHIFT4 SECURE PAYMENT PROCESSING, STORING CREDIT 
CARD DATA: A LOOK AT THE BUSINESS NEEDS, REGULATIONS AND SOLUTIONS 
REGARDING THE ISSUE 7 (2006), http://www.shift4.com/pdf/s4-wp0801_storing-credit-
card-data.pdf; First Data & McMillon, supra note 60, at 12. 
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Federation’s long-standing complaints,119 that merchants should not be 
obligated to store credit card numbers for retrieval requests120 and 
indicated that acquiring banks should allow merchants to use 
tokenization.121
The silence and lack of movement surrounding storage and 
tokenization are telling, since tokenization requires a top-to-bottom 
approach to work effectively.  Those at the top must keep the credit card 
data in a vault, while those at the bottom must keep the tokens.
  While this is a first step, it is hard not to wonder if it is 
an empty magnanimous gesture.  PCI is the organ through which 
security changes are implemented in the industry.  There is no 
movement to reflect these changes there.  Moreover, it does not seem 
there will be any changes made any time soon: PCI is controlled by five 
credit card companies, none of which has joined Visa’s statement. 
122  As 
one expert has stated, tokenization would “require the development and 
implementation of a new payment processing protocol.  All card 
processors would need to certify with the card brands that they can 
process the new payment systems, and all point-of-sale (POS) systems 
would need to be both modified and certified for the new protocol.”123
 
 
5. PCI Does Not Aggressively Push for New Security Technologies  
           that Change the Status Quo 
 
The card companies’ passivity on tokenization is symptomatic of 
 
 119. See, e.g., Letter from David Hogan, Chief Information Officer, National Retail 
Federation, to Bob Russo, PCI Security Standards Council, LLC (Oct. 2, 2007), 
available at  http://www.nrf.com/modules.php?name=News&op=viewlive&sp_id=380; 
see also Marcia Savage, Visa: Banks Shouldn’t Force Merchants To Store Full Card 
Data, SEARCHFINANCIALSECURITY.COM (July 15, 2010), http://searchfinancialsecurity. 
techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,sid185_gci1516765,00.html. 
 120. Visa Inc., Visa Best Practices for Primary Account Number Storage and 
Truncation (July 14, 2010), http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/PAN_truncation_ 
best_practices.pdf. 
 121. See Savage, supra note 119, at 1 (“Acquirers and issuers must allow merchants 
to present ‘a truncated, disguised or masked card number on a transaction receipt’ for 
dispute resolution . . . [since] the unnecessary storage of full Primary Account Numbers 
(PANs) by merchants has led to data compromise, theft and unintentional disclosure . . . 
.”). 
 122. Avivah Litan, Proposed PCI Changes Would Improve Merchant’s Data 
Security, GARTNER.COM (Oct. 10, 2007), http://www.gartner.com/DisplayDocument 
?doc_cd=152561. 
 123. Id. 
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their overall approach to security.  Although the technology sector is 
highly innovative,124
Take “chip and PIN” technology.
 the card brands do not push hard for the industry to 
adopt new solutions that would alter the status quo. 
125
Yet, chip and PIN technology has not made inroads either with PCI 
or with card companies,
  It replaces the magnetic stripe 
on the credit card with a smartcard that has an embedded microchip.  
The cardholder swipes his or her smart card and enters his or her 
personal identification number (“PIN”).  The use of a PIN makes 
hacking harder because some of the information needed to conclude a 
sale rests in the cardholder’s memory.  Not all of it is on the card, as 
with the traditional credit card.  Furthermore, the data on the chip-card 
remains useless until it is decrypted using the PIN. 
126 despite its proven track record in lowering 
fraud.  France, for instance, introduced a chip-based PIN system in 1993 
and saw counterfeiting fall by 78 percent and fraud losses by 50 percent 
in the first year.127  By 1996, counterfeiting charges effectively had been 
eliminated.  By 1998, banks were saving about 0.1 percent of sales 
volume on fraud.128  In the United Kingdom (“UK”), the “success of 
chipand PIN has meant that over the past four years losses on 
transactions on the UK high street have reduced by 67% from £218.8m 
in 2004 to £72.1m in 2009.”129
PCS has also overlooked many other robust technologies.  Take 
end-to-end encryption (“E3”), in which cardholder data is encrypted 
from the point of sale until it is received by the payment processor.  E3 





 124. See e.g., Payment Security Solutions, CYBERSOURCE.COM, 
http://www.cybersource.com/products_and_services/payment_security/ (last visited 
Nov. 18, 2010). 
  New data-mining technologies also can help protect 
 125. CHIP AND PIN, http://www.chipandpin.co.uk (last visited Nov. 18, 2010). 
 126. See Claes Bell, Are Chip and PIN Credit Cards Coming?, FOX BUS. (Feb. 17, 
2010), http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2010/02/17/chip-pin-credit-cards-
coming/. 
 127. Sushila Nair, Why the Adoption of Chip and PIN Technology is Inevitable, 
SECURE THINKING (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.btsecurethinking.com/2009/12/why-the-
adoption-of-chip-and-pin-technology-is-inevitable/. 
 128. Id. 
 129. UK Payments Admin., Card Fraud Facts and Figures, 
http://www.ukpayments.org.uk/resources_publications/key_facts_and_figures/card_frau
d_facts_and_figures/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2010). 
 130. See First Data & McMillon, supra note 60.  See also, Thomas Claburn, Credit 
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merchants from online fraud by identifying and preventing criminals 
trying to use stolen credit cards.131
 
 
6. Leadership is Needed to Coordinate the Implementation of New  
           Technologies System-wide: Where is it? 
 
Implementing new technologies requires leadership from the credit 
card companies for a number of reasons.  First, some technologies, such 
as Chip and PIN, require broad implementation to work.  It would be 
pointless for a merchant to invest in PIN technology today since U.S. 
payment systems do not support it.  Broad implementation is best 
coordinated from the top. 
Second, system-wide coordination is often needed to ensure that 
merchants who use the new technologies of a bank or payment processor 
are not locked into a relationship with them.  For example, imagine that 
a payment processor offers to tokenize a merchant’s data gratis.  The 
merchant, enticed by the free offer, signs up.  A year later, however, the 
processor raises rates substantially.  Unless the industry has a system-
wide process for tokenization, the merchant would be stuck with the 
initial processor.  A new processor could not map or decipher the tokens 
for lack of the original mapping file.  The initial mapping tables belong 
to the original processor.  A uniform process might ensure that 
merchants “own” their data, but the payment processor or bank would 
hold it in trust for them so that when they move to a new institution, the 
original institutions transfers it for them. 
 
IV. CAUSES OF THE PROBLEM: WHY THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY  
MAY NOT BE INTERESTED IN SEEING DATA SECURITY REFORM 
The General Manager of the PCI Security Council recently 
conceded that the Council is interested in fighting credit card fraud only 
 
Card Processors Getting Encryption Religion, INFORMATIONWEEK (Nov. 21, 2009), 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/encryption/showArticle.jhtml?articleI
D=221900322. 
 131. See Show Me How It Works, THREATMETRIX, http://threatmetrix.com/our-
solutions/show-me-how-it-works/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2010).  PCI, however, focuses 
only on protecting credit card data before it is stolen.  It glosses over protecting 
merchants against the use of credit card data that has already been stolen. 
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if it can do so “within the existing system.”132
A. FOLLOW THE MONEY: THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY’S LACK OF 
INCENTIVES TO INITIATE FAR-RANGING ANTI-FRAUD REFORMS 
  Why this limitation?  
This section of the article explores the financial incentives and the 
historical background that lie at the root of this attitude. 
1. Credit Card Companies’ Incentives 
 
Overall, credit card companies do not have strong incentives to get 
serious about fraud on an industry-wide, systemic basis.  They get paid 
every time their credit card is used, even in fraudulent transactions.  
Their revenue mostly comes from “assessment fees,” a percentage of the 
price of every purchase made using their card brand – 0.0925 percent for 
Visa and 0.0950 percent for MasterCard and Discover.133  The fee is not 
returned in the event of fraud.  They can also collect fines when 
companies are breached.134
Credit card companies may also have good reason to avoid trying 
new technologies that could jeopardize their revenue.  If “chip and PIN” 
technology were used on credit cards, for example, card data might be 
transmitted across existing networks used for PIN debit cards rather than 
across credit card networks.  If so, companies that operate PIN networks, 
like NYCE and Star,
  This insulates the companies from the 
immediate financial effects of credit card fraud. 
135
This is not to say that credit card companies do not care about fraud 
in the industry.  They did, after all, establish PCI.  However, it is likely 
that their biggest concern regarding fraud in the industry is keeping it 
 would profit, while credit card companies might 
not profit. 
 
 132. Anton Chuvakin, RSA 2010 Exclusive PCI Security Standards Council 
Interview, SECURITY WARRIOR BLOG (Mar. 12, 2010), http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/ 
2010/03/rsa-2010-exclusive-pci-security.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2010). 
 133. See Electronic Exchange Systems, Merchant Credit Card Processing 
Agreement (2009), available at http://www.oneclickdining.com/images/pdf/ 
MOTO_setup.pdf. 
 134. See Higgins, supra note 104.  Card Association members can fine acquiring 
banks between $5,000 to $100,000 per month for PCI compliance violations and 
merchants and other players between $5,000 to $25,000 a month.  Id. 
 135. Barbara Pacheco & Richard Sullivan, Interchange Fees in Credit and Debit 
Card Markets: What Role for Public Authorities?, FED. RESERVE BANK KANSAS CITY 
ECON. REV. 92 (2006), available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/econrev/ 
PDF/1q06pach.pdf. 
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from reaching such high levels that it would scare significant numbers of 
customers from using cards because their profits depend on transaction 
volume.  It would probably take an enormous scandal before concerns of 
fraud caused consumers to stop using credit cards, for several reasons. 
First, credit cards are highly convenient.136  Second, perceptions of 
fraud levels, rather than real fraud levels, are what truly matter with 
respect to frightening customers.  In this regard, credit card companies 
benefit from the fact that accurate measures of credit card fraud are 
notoriously difficult to find.137  It is suspected that credit card fraud is 
vastly underreported.138  Real figures are shrouded in secrecy.  No 
federal repository for data breach information exists.139  State breach 
notification laws are so riddled with loopholes as to make them virtually 
useless.140  PCI rules prohibit its investigators and assessors from 
disclosing any information acquired in the line of service about 
noncompliance or breaches.141  Menn suggests that the card companies 
and banks profit so much from the underreporting of fraud that they 
“didn’t just keep quiet” about it, but also “actively worked to distort the 
public discourse,” sponsoring, in one case, a seemingly objective report 
that downplayed the severity of the problem.142
In fact, lulling consumers into a sense of security about credit card 
fraud has been an industry priority.  One of the industry’s broadest 




 136. Scott Schuh et al., Who Gains and Who Loses from Credit Card Payments?:  
Theory and Calibrations, (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Paper No. 10-3, 2010), 
available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppdp/2010/ppdp1003.pdf. 
 under which 
 137. Ben Ngugi et al., Evaluating the Quality and Usefulness of Information from 
Current Data Breach Notification Systems (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with International Journal of Information Security and Privacy). 
 138. Identity Theft Laws – How the Legal System Can Protect You, 
EMAILSCAMMERS.COM, http://www.emailscammers.com/identity-theft-laws-how-the-
legal-system-can-protect-you/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2010). 
 139. See Ngugi et al., supra note 137. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See PCI Securities Standards Council, Qualified Security Assessor (QSA) 
Agreement, app. A, available at https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pdfs/ 
pci_qualified_security_assessor_qsa_agreement.pdf (stipulating in clause A.6.1 that the 
QSA agreement contract requires total confidentiality). 
 142. See MENN, FATAL SYSTEM ERROR, supra note 3, at 116. 
 143. See, e.g., MasterCard Zero Liability, MASTERCARD.COM, available at 
http://www.mastercard.com/us/personal/en/cardholderservices/zeroliability.html (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2010); Visa Security Program: Zero Liability, VISA.COM, available at 
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victimized consumers generally pay nothing for unauthorized charges, 
less even than the $50 they would otherwise pay under TILA144 and 
Regulation Z.145
It seems that all of the security improvements that the ‘credit card 
industry’ (meaning the issuing banks and card brands) puts out there 
are aimed at the consumer. . . . And that makes sense, because the 
‘credit card industry’ wants consumers to trust their product and use 
them as their preferred payment instrument.
  As one expert noted: 
146
Unfortunately, manipulating public perception of danger is much 
easier than tackling the reality of criminals’ ability to hold the credit 
card system hostage.  As long as those perceptions continue and card 
companies do not feel the financial repercussions of fraud, it would be 
unreasonable to expect drastic change in their attitude towards security 
on an industry-wide basis. 
 
 
2. Issuing Banks’ Incentives 
 
Most people think that the issuing bank bears the brunt of credit 
card fraud losses,147 for it is the issuing bank that consumers call when 
they see unauthorized charges on their bills, and that seems to cover 
those costs.148  In reality, however, issuers shift much of the cost of 
credit card fraud to the retailer who sold the goods to the thief.  First, by 
contract, issuing banks only absorb credit card losses when the thief 




The retailer, however, takes the hit when the thief makes the purchase 
 144. 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (a)(1)(B) (2009). 
 145. 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(b)(1) (2008);  see also Duncan B. Douglass, An 
Examination of the Fraud Liability Shift in Consumer Card-based Payment Systems, 33 
ECON. PERSP. 43 (2009). 
 146. Robert McMillon, Helping the Merchant, SPEAKING OF SECURITY: THE 
OFFICIAL RSA BLOG AND PODCAST (July 13, 2010), http://blogs.rsa.com/mcmillon/ 
helping-the-merchant/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2010). 
 147. See MENN, FATAL SYSTEM ERROR, supra note 3, at 116. 
 148. Douglass, supra note 145, at 47. 
 149. See, e.g., Visa, Inc., Visa International Operating Regulations 881-88, 893-901 
(2010), available at http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/visa-international-
operating-regulations-main.pdf; see also MasterCard Worldwide, Chargeback Guide 
(2010), available at  http://www.mastercard.com/us/merchant/pdf/TB_CB_Manual.pdf.  
See generally, Douglass, supra note 145. 
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over the phone, internet, or by mail, known as “card-not-present” 
transactions.150  Under this arrangement, merchants absorb about twice 
as much loss as issuers, since online fraud is thought to cost twice as 
much as in-person fraud.151
Nevertheless, the issuing bank can charge back to the retailer all 
fraudulent “card-present” sales in which the retailer failed to obey a 
contractual requirement.  Therefore, if the signature on the receipt does 
not match the signature on the credit card, the issuer can charge the 
retailer for the fraud on the grounds that he or she failed to verify the 
signature, as required by contract.
 
152  Banks charge the merchants $25 to 
$35 for every such “charge-back.”153  Observers suggest that the number 
of charge-backs is growing as issuing banks selectively choose154 retail 
transactions in a concerted industry effort to shift at least some of the 
liability to retailers.155
The second manner in which issuing banks can shift some of the 
costs of fraud to merchants is through interchange fees.  The less 
competitive a market is, the more a business can increase prices without 
losing market share.
 
156  The market for interchange fees is rather 
uncompetitive.157
 
 150. MasterCard, Chargeback Guide, supra note 147, at 6-7. The merchant absorbs 
the loss unless he or she “1) performed an address verification at the time the 
transaction was authorized (that is, verified that the person conducting the transaction 
could validate the billing address associated with the payment card being used); 2) 
delivered the purchased merchandise to an address that matches the address validated 
through the address verification; and 3) obtained proof that the purchased goods were 
delivered to the verified address.” Douglass, supra note 145, at 45-6.  See also NPC, 
supra note 74, at 12. 
  The card brands set the interchange fees and the 
 151. KEN PATERSON, MERCATOR ADVISORY GRP., CREDIT CARD ISSUE FRAUD 
MANAGEMENT (2008), http://www.sas.com/news/analysts/mercator_fraud_1208.pdf. 
 152. See, e.g., Visa International Operating Regulations, supra note 149, at 464; see 
also Fraud Control Basics: Card-Present, VISA.COM, available at 
http://usa.visa.com/merchants/risk_management/card_present.html. 
 153. Robert Berner & Adrienne Carter, The Truth About Credit-Card Fraud, 
BUSINESSWEEK (June 21, 2005), www.businessweek.com/technology/content/ 
jun2005/tc20050621_3238_tc024.htm. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See generally, Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Cooperation Among 
Competitors: Some Economics of Payment Card Associations, 33 RAND J. ECON. 549 
(2002). 
 157. See Adam J. Levitin, Payment Wars: The Merchant-Bank Struggle for Control 
of Payment Systems, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 425, 426-31 (2007). 
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issuing banks agree to impose them.158  There is no competition among 
the banks to lure merchants to accept a particular credit card brand by 
lowering the fees.  In fact, with Visa and MasterCard controlling around 
80 percent of volume of credit card transactions,159 the card brands wield 
such a large degree of market power that retailers have little choice but 
to pay the fee.160
The only competition regarding interchange fees comes from the 
credit card companies themselves.  They compete to have issuing banks 
issue their brand of credit card by offering to set higher interchange fees 
than their rivals.
 
161  This competition increases prices for merchants.162  
Indeed, American interchange fees, which are now between one to three 
percent of the purchase price of each transaction,163 have been rising 
steadily since 2000164 despite bitter protests from retailers.165
 
 158. Andrew Martin, The Card Game: How Visa, Using Card Fees, Dominates a 
Market, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/01/05/your-money/credit-and-debit-cards/05visa.html?_r=1. 
  The 
 159. See Maria Aspan, Visa, MasterCard Growth May Outweigh Regulations, 
REUTERS, May 20, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
idUSN2022077920100520.  See also Nilson Report, supra note 15 (explaining Visa 
controlled 64.79% of the 2009 global market share in terms of volume of purchase 
transactions, MasterCard controlled 26.5%, and American Express controlled 4.57%). 
 160. See Adam Levitin, Credit Card Fair Fee Act, CREDIT SLIPS, (Mar. 30, 2008, 
7:51 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2008/03/credit-card-fai.html.  The 
barriers to enter the credit card industry are high.  Even if a new rival offered a lower 
interchange rate, as long as customers preferred existing brands, the company could not 
succeed. Indeed, no business has entered the market since Discover did in 1985.  It 
would be difficult to get customers because issuing banks, who pocket the interchange 
fees, would want to go with the card brand that offered them the highest fee. Proprietary 
cards, such as an Amazon.com card, are accepted only at a single retailer and do not 
realistically substitute for general purpose cards such as a Visa card.  Id. 
 161. See Rochet & Tirole, supra note 156. 
 162. See Martin, supra note 158.  Vigorous competition by the card brands on 
interchange fees has the unusual effect of raising prices for merchants, not lowering 
them.  Card companies vie for issuing banks’ business by offering higher interchange 
fees and make their cards more appealing by offering higher interchange fees.  The card 
companies do not compete for merchants’ business. As a result, there is currently 
upward pressure on interchange fees.  See id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id.; see also Getahn Ward, Merchants Pay More to Accept Credit Cards, THE 
TENNESSEAN, Apr. 8, 2010, available at http://www.tennessean.com/article/ 
20070408/BUSINESS01/704080362/Merchants-pay-more-to-accept-credit-cards 
(“Most interchange costs come as a flat fee of 10 to 25 cents per transaction, plus a 
percentage of the sale, about 2 % on average.  Thus, a $100 purchase would include $2 
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interchange fees charged are the highest in the world,166 yet, as one court 
found in 2001, “both Visa and MasterCard have raised prices and 
restricted output without losing merchant customers.”167  American 
courts have not yet held that interchange fees violate antitrust laws.168
Issuing banks can also slip the bill to consumers through higher 
credit card and banking costs.  Although the 2009 Credit Card 
Accountability, Responsibility, and Disclosure Act of 2009 (“Credit 
Card Act”)
 
169 plugged a number of revenue streams that the banks 
enjoyed from credit cards, such as high over-draft fees,170
 
or slightly more in fees, which the credit card company shares with the bank that issued 
its card and the bank that processes the purchase for the merchant.”). 
 plenty of 
 165. See MANN, CHARGING AHEAD, supra note 72. 
 166. See Levitin, Payment Wars, supra note 157, at 462. 
 167. United States v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 168. See Steven Semeraro, Credit Card Interchange Fees: Three Decades of 
Antitrust Uncertainty, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 941, 996 (2007).  Not all uncompetitive 
situations, however, meet the law’s definition.  The Sherman Act does not, for example, 
prevent monopoly status that is earned through good business decisions.  See United 
States v. Aluminum Corp. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).  
Furthermore, some commentators feel that some of the past interchange fee antitrust 
cases were wrongly decided and, therefore, are not truly dispositive.  See, e.g., Levitin, 
Credit Card Fair Fee Act, supra note 160.  Indeed, antitrust litigation concerning 
interchange fees remains very much alive.  One case pending in the Eastern District of 
New York consolidates forty actions against Visa and MasterCard.  See In re Payment 
Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 562 F.Supp. 2d 392 (E.D.N.Y. 
2008).  In addition, Europe has found interchange fees to violate its antitrust laws.  The 
European Commission’s antitrust authority ruled in 2008 that MasterCard’s interchange 
fees were illegal.  Press Release, European Commission for Competition Policy, 
Commission Prohibits MasterCard’s Intra-EEA Multilateral Interchange Fees (Dec. 19, 
2007), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference= 
SPEECH/07/832&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.  In 2009, 
the European Commission’s antitrust authority charged that Visa’s interchange fees 
were also illegal.  See EC Hits Visa Europe with Interchange Antitrust Charge, 
FINEXTRA.COM (Apr. 6, 2009, 4:18 PM), http://www.finextra.com/news/ 
fullstory.aspx?newsitemid=19881; see also Press Release, Visa, Inc., Settlement on 
Visa Debit Interchange Fees Aids SEPA (Apr. 26, 2010), available at 
http://www.visaeurope.com/en/newsroom/news/articles/2010/visa_interchange_fees_ai
d_sepa.aspx; Matthew Dalton & Pepp Kiviniemi, EU Charges Visa Europe Over Fees, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2009, at C2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB123902543327292827.html. 
 169. Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009). 
 170. 12 C.F.R. § 205.17 (2009). 
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loopholes remain.171
Issuing banks may also feel that they are doing enough to bring 
fraud down to acceptable levels.  Most use neural networks to track 
individual cardholder purchases and spending habits.  The network’s 
ability to alert the bank to transactions that do not fit those habits
  All this blunts the urgency that banks might 
otherwise feel to initiate broad, system-wide anti-fraud strategies that 
cover merchants and other stakeholders. 
172 has 
helped mitigate certain kinds of fraud, and may give the banks a sense 
that they are doing enough.  However, the technology is not failsafe.173
 
  
Moreover, the banks’ adeptness at diverting their losses likely colors 
their evaluation of what is enough  to decrease fraud. 
3. Acquiring Banks’ Incentives 
 
Some people think that if the merchant is hacked, the acquiring 
bank pays for the damages, including fines.174  Visa publicly reports that 
it fines acquiring banks hundreds of millions of dollars a year for their 
merchants who are breached while not compliant with PCI.175  However, 
card brands fine the acquiring banks when the merchant has been hacked 
because the credit card company’s contract is with the acquiring bank, 
not the merchant.176
However, it is less well known that acquiring banks are 
contractually entitled to indemnification by merchants for any losses 
they incur as a result of the breach, including fines.
 
177
Acquiring banks also can offset fraud losses indirectly through the 
  Acquiring banks 
deduct the amount of the fine and any other losses it incurred from the 
merchant’s bank account. 
 
 171. Jaclyn Rodriguez, The Credit Card Act of 2009: An Effective But Incomplete 
Solution Evidencing the Need for a Federal Regulator, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 309, 328 
(2010). 
 172. Craig Bicknell, EFalcon Preys on Credit Card Fraud, WIRED (May 13, 1999), 
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/1999/05/19662. 
 173. See Jay MacDonald, Fraud, Identity Theft, Grow at ATMs, 
CARDSWITCHTECHNOLOGY.COM (Jul. 17, 2008), http://www.cardswitchtechnology.com/ 
Documents/News3.pdf. 
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discount fees they charge retailers, which is now 0.07 percent per 
transaction.178
B. FOLLOW THE HISTORY:  
WHY THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS DATA SECURITY IS SO INSULAR  
  All this would weaken acquiring banks’ incentives to 
effect broad-based changes. 
The historical roots of the two largest card brands, Visa and 
MasterCard, provide another way to understand why the card brands and 
banks seem so self-interested in their approach to security.  From the 
1960s, when they came into being, and until recently, the main card 
brands were structured as not-for-profit membership associations owned 
by issuing and acquiring banks.179  In contrast to regular stock 
corporations, in which shareholders tend not to have direct outside 
business relationships with the firm, a membership association’s 
members do business with and are involved in running the association.  
Each member received a certain number of votes to influence how the 
association was run.180  The higher a member’s yearly volume of 
transactions, the more votes it held.181  Members selected the 
Association’s Board of Directors, which was almost always drawn from 
the senior management at the largest member banks.182
Although Visa
 
183 and MasterCard184 recently went public, becoming 
shareholder-owned companies, experts note that the reorganizations 
have not fundamentally changed the way they operate.185  One scholar 
observed, MasterCard’s and Visa’s “post-IPO capital structure is 
designed to permit banks to retain effective control over the company 
without holding a majority of shares and giving a veneer of 
independence to decisions. . . .”186
 
 178. See Martin, supra note 158; see also Pacheco & Sullivan, supra note 135. 
 
 179. See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 57, at 63.  The banks agreed to 
cooperate on setting operational standards, but to compete for merchants and 
cardholders.  Id. 
 180. Id. at 162. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Katie Benner, Visa IPO Prices at Record $17.9, CNN MONEY (Mar. 18, 2008), 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/18/news/companies/visa_ipo.fortune/index.htm. 
 184. Tess Vigeland, MasterCard IPO, MARKETPLACE PUBLIC RADIO, May 3, 2006, 
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2006/05/03/mastercard_ipo/. 
 185. EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 57, at 162. 
 186. Levitin, Credit Card Fair Fee Act, supra note 160. 
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Thus, the system, while not completely ignoring merchant and 
consumer interests,187 tilts in favor of the banks and credit card 
companies because it was designed for them.188
 
  They can continue in 
that tradition today because they control the industry’s infrastructure.  
They control PCI, hand down its rules, enforce them, impose fines, 
decide who to de-list, fix fees charged to merchants, and decide whether 
to impose higher PCI standards on breached companies.  They 
essentially play the role of prosecutor, judge, and jury.  Barring 
litigation, their decisions are final. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 
Stemming credit card fraud requires federal intervention.  The 
credit card companies and banks have weak incentives to crush the 
ability of criminals to infiltrate not just banks, but also merchants, large 
and small.  The current go-it-alone approach may help secure an 
individual company or a defined group.  Ultimately, however, it drives 
fraud to other, less protected businesses, since cyber criminals look “for 
easy pickings.”189
A. MAKE SECURITY STANDARDS MANDATORY 
  Therefore, we propose the enactment of a new federal 
law to direct the process of creating security standards that would tackle 
credit card fraud across the card industry. 
We propose making security standards mandatory for all 
companies, regardless of size or type, that are involved in credit card 
transactions.  Following the European Union model of having a public 
authority oversee the development of security rules and settle 
disputes,190
 
 187. Id. 
 we propose the appointment of a Data Security 
Commissioner (“Commissioner”) to oversee the enactment of new 
 188. See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 57, at 163. 
 189. Zafar: Banks Need to Outsmart Criminals, EURACTIV.COM (Jan. 31, 2010),  
http://www.euractiv.com/en/financial-services/zafar-banks-need-outsmart-criminals 
(last visited Aug. 16, 2010); see also, Gary Palgon, Best Practices In Data Protection 
(April 21, 2010), RETAILSOLUTIONSONLINE.COM, http://communications. 
retailsolutionsonline.com/article.mvc/Best-Practices-In-Data-Protection-0004 
(describing cyber criminals as opportunists). 
 190. Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 28, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 47, 48. 
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security standards. 
B. LET STAKEHOLDERS DRAWN FROM THE INDUSTRY  
DESIGN THE SECURITY STANDARDS  
The industry should design the security standards, as it is best 
situated to know its needs.  However, to establish incentives to design 
the best system for all, on an industry-wide basis, the process should 
include all stakeholders, including merchants.  Including all stakeholders 
is key to redressing the skewed incentives inherent in the industry’s 
current lopsided power structure. 
Therefore, we propose that a new Data Security Council 
(“Council”) create industry standards and replace the one-sided PCI 
Executive Council.  The new Council’s membership would be drawn 
from groups across the industry: merchants of all sizes and sectors, 
payment processors, experts in security technologies, as well as banks 
and credit card companies.  The associations representing the various 
parties, such as the American Bankers’ Association and the National 
Federation of Retailers, would determine who should represent them on 
the Council.  Our proposed Commissioner should also be a member of 
the Council. 
This structure would allow for a representation of the industry’s 
multi-faceted perspectives on security.  Proposals for such multi-
stakeholder dialogue have appeared in recent years.  Examples include 
the United Nations Global Compact and the European Multi-Stakeholder 
Forum on Corporation Social Responsibility, “which propose dialogue 
among the different agents involved as a working methodology aimed at 
making headway in multilateral consensus proposals.”191
C. LET THE COUNCIL GATHER INFORMATION 
 
The Commissioner, in his or her position as a member of the 
Council, should have the power to compel companies to supply 
information about the type, extent, and costs of credit card fraud and 
related issues.192
 
 191. Laura Albareda et al., 
  That information should be shared with the Council. 
Public Policies on Corporate Social Responsibility: The 
Role of Governments in Europe, 74 J. BUS. ETHICS 391, 393 (2007). 
 192. This power follows a recommendation in the Durbin Amendment asking the 
Federal Reserve Bank to consider certain factors when drafting anti-fraud regulations 
related to debit cards. Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203 
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Appropriate information should be made public.  Lack of accurate 
information about fraud undoubtedly contributed to the inertia about 
security in the industry.  Raising awareness of the magnitude of fraud 
will help sustain the pressure for reform. 
D. CUT INTERCHANGE FEES FOR COMPLIANT COMPANIES;  
DON’T FOR NONCOMPLIANT ONES  
Security costs money.  The smaller the company, the bigger the 
burden.  Since the credit card companies own the card technology and 
they and the banks operate the networks, they would contribute the 
major investment in implementing standards.  Small merchants would 
probably have to buy point of sale (“POS”) machines to read whatever 
new cards the Council may propose.  Larger merchants might 
additionally need to buy new software and hardware and integrate their 
networks with the new technology. 
We propose giving merchants incentives to comply.  For those 
merchants who are fully compliant with the new standards, the 
Commissioner would cap the interchange rate at a substantial discount 
of its current rate.  For non-compliant merchants, interchange rates 
would be deregulated, with the banks and credit card companies free to 
charge what they wish.  The goal would be to have a significant 
difference between the interchange rates for complaint and non-
compliant firms.  This would give merchants an immediate major 
financial benefit to becoming compliant.  At the same time, investing in 
better security would lower merchants’ own losses to fraud over the 
long-term. 
Under this proposal, the banks and card companies would indirectly 
subsidize merchant compliance, since they would be receiving lower 
fees from compliant companies.  However, this would be justified 
because they presumably would have less fraud to deal with as 
merchants become more secure. 
The difference in interchange rates could also spawn entrepreneurs 
willing to lease POS systems to merchants for a fraction of the money 
they would save on interchange fees when becoming secure, making 
compliance even more affordable for certain retailers. 
 
§§ 1075(a)(5)(B)(ii)(I)-(V), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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E. MAKE LYING ABOUT SECURITY COMPLIANCE A FELONY 
The law would make it a felony for merchants to lie about whether 
they are security compliant and subject them to fines if they lie.  Today, 
the consequences of lying about PCI compliance stand unclear.  The 
new law needs to make them clear. 
F. REDUCE THE ABILITY TO SHIFT FRAUD LOSSES DOWNSTREAM  
The banks’ use of loopholes in the wake of the Credit Card Act of 
2009 suggests193
It is time for the private sector, with the help of the public sector, to 
reconsider how to make our payment system safe from top to bottom.  
We hope that some of the suggestions herein might help move the 
system in that direction. 
 that it would be difficult to reduce banks’ ability to 
shift losses.  However, their ability to shift losses is problematic only if 
the banks are the only entities responsible for setting the industry’s 
security standards – because it weakens their desire to secure the system 
for all.  However, under the new law, a Council represented by multiple 
stakeholders and overseen by a public Commissioner would set industry 
security standards.  The standards would be mandatory and penalties 
would follow noncompliance. 
 
 
 193. See Rodriguez, supra note 171, at 324-8. 
